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THE ORGANIZED BAR:
COURT REFORM

A CATALYST FOR

Paul R.J. Connolly*

Throughout the past decade court reformers have been searching
for a system of procedural rules which will help courts minimize both
the delay and the expense of litigation. Over the last two years, Kentucky
courts have experimented with rules which cut trial court delay by over
fifty percent and substantially reduce the time lawyers spend exercising procedural rights. 1 Encouraged by the favorable results of this
experiment, 2 the Kentucky Supreme Court has ordered that these rules
be gradually implemented in all Kentucky trial courts of general
jurisdiction.
The Chief Justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court, John Palmore,
was the key figure behind both the rule-making and implementation
stages of the Kentucky reform process; the organized bar's role in this
process was minimal. The Kentucky Bar Association had no part in
making or implementing the new rules and local bar association involvement was modest and ad hoc. The active involvement of Justice Palmore
was partially due to the requisites of Kentucky law - the Kentucky
constitution vests exclusive rule-making authority with the Supreme
Court 3 - and partially to the Chief Justice's strong interest in trial
court reform and his concomitant willingness to take control of the
reform process. In most states, however, there is unlikely to be some-

• Assistant Staff Director, ASA Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delay. A.B.,
1967, Assumption College; J.D., 1974, Georgetown University Law Center.
I. For a comprehensive discussion of the Kentucky reforms, see Connolly & Planet, Controlling the Caseflow - Kentucky Style, 21 JUDGES' J. 8 (1982). This article concludes that the
Kentucky Rules should form the structure for other trial court costs and delay reduction programs. Assuming ample judicial resources and the absence of statutory constraints, a caseflow
management program (based on the Kentucky caseflow principles) can be crafted for any trial
court or trial judge in a way that will substantially duplicate the success of the program in Kentucky. Id. at 59.
2. Connolly and Planet report that the Kentucky Rules resulted in less delay, with the average
case subject to the Kentucky Rules closing 11 months earlier than under normal procedures;
lower attorneys' fees because judicial control over the discovery process reduced discovery formality;
a faster pace of litigation, prompting settlements earlier in the process and savings in time lawyers
spent on procedural matters, resulted in savings to clients paying by the hour and by flat fees;
and lower court costs. The amount of time that judges spent per case was not increased, because
a reduction in hearings on motions offset the increase in conference activity. Quality of justice,
measured by trial preparation time and settlement figures, was not affected. See generally id.
3. KY. CONST. §§ II, 116.
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one like Justice Palmore having 60th the constitutional authority to
effect major trial court reforms, and the personal commitment to achieve
them. To the extent that these states wish to duplicate Kentucky's successes, they cannot fail to make the bar an integral element of the
court reform process.
Some state bar associations have been integrated into the judicial
legislation process by the legislature or the courts deeming them to
be continuing commissions on judicial administration. The state bar
is often made a partner of the courts in the effort to minimize the
cost and delay of resolving disputes. Because government, including
the judicial branch, serves the public best when held accountable by
dispassionate outsiders, oversight of court operations and stimulating
the policy-making phase of reform are fundamental necessities. Neither
the legislative nor the executive branch can perform these functions
nearly as effectively as the bar. Yet, a survey of state chief justices
revealed that few believe their bar associations currently have a significant impact on rule making. 4 One obvious reason for this is that one
third of all state bar associations do not have a committee responsible
for administration of civil justice issues. s Many of these states have
unified bars, like the Kentucky Bar Association, that have not been
empowered by state government to act as commissions on judicial
administration. 6 And though voluntary bars have no such legislative
impediments - indeed, state and local bars rarely have active committees to study and oversee the administration of civil justice - the survey
nonetheless suggests that their contributions to court reform have been
minor.
This Article theorizes that state and local bar associations can play
a vital role in ridding their courts of excessive costs and delay. Theory
can become practice, however, only if state and local bars are reorganized to broaden their oversight and lobbying functions, in order to
make them more effective vehicles of reform. 7 This Article, then,

4. See C. KORBAKES, J. ALFINI & C. GRAU, JUDICIAL RuLEMAKING IN THE STATE COURTS
249-56 (1978). The survey revealed that only 420Jo of the chief justices deemed the state bar's
contribution "very significant," 280Jo thought the bar's contribution was "moderately significant," IOOJo thought it was "slightly significant," and 200Jo believed it was "not significant."
5. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIRECTORY OF BAR ACTIVITIES 18 (1980). Only 190Jo of the
bar groups had a committee with some responsibility for reducing litigation costs and only 430Jo
had a similar committee working for delay reduction.
6. A unified bar has two essential features: (I) as a condition of Ii censure all lawyers are
required to be dues-paying members; (2) the bar association is created by court rule or legislation. A voluntary bar is a private, voluntary membership entity. Nineteen states have no unified
bars. Of the remaining 33 states (including the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico) with unified bars, four also have voluntary bar associations. American Bar Associations, 1980-81 Directory Bar Associations 33 (Chicago, 1980).
7. Currently, the ABA Action Commission is attempting to gain insights into the validity
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discusses the role the organized bar can and should play in achieving
procedural reform that will reduce the delay and cost of litigation. Part
I describes the various stages of the reform process, using the Kentucky experiment as a model, 8 and outlines the contributions that can
be made by bar associations at each stage. Part II sets out a structural
model for bar associations that will enable the organized bar to become
an effective and efficient court reform agent.

I.

THE BAR'S ROLE IN THE REFORM PROCESS

As evidenced by the Kentucky experiment, the process of revising
procedural court rules entails two rather broad phases, each comprised
of several distinct steps. First, those involved with the reform effort
must identify the specific areas in which reform is needed, and develop
rules that will best respond to the problems identified. Once this policymaking stage is completed, reformers must have an effective means
to implement these rules. At both the policy-making and implementation levels of the reform process, the organized bar's role is crucial.

A.

Policy-Making

Making judicial policy to effect court reform involves three discrete
steps. First, those advocating reform must encourage judicial
policymakers, whether the judicial or legislative branch, to acknowledge
that reform is necessary. Second, reformers must analyze the problems
that are most pressing and explore all alternative ways of resolving
them. Finally, rules must be formulated that are responsive to these
problems.
1. Acknowledgement- The most serious obstacle to achieving procedural reform at the trial court level may be the judiciary's failure
to recognize the serious consequences of the cost and delay of litigation. In Kentucky, such judicial myopia was not a problem. Chief Justice
Palmore of the Kentucky Supreme Court had become concerned that
delay and costs were forcing state policy-makers to consider alternative
methods of dispute resolution, and that classic adjudication was not
being given a chance to prove its effectiveness. Even without the encouragement of the organized bar, Chief Justice Palmore was willing
to experiment with rules of practice that would hasten dispute resolution by requiring trial judges to supervise attorneys' conduct of litigation.
of this theory. A survey is being conducted of several state bar associations detailing bar activity
and organization in promoting court reform. The study will focus on political strategies that
have aided bar-promoted court reform, as well as common barriers to successful reform efforts.
8. Much of the description of the Kentucky reform process that follows is based on the author's
personal observations. A report documenting this material is available from the author.
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Few other chief justices, however, have shown a similar interest in
moving their trial court systems along the path to comprehensive docket
reform. 9 This suggests that, even though the judicial branch is often
authorized to modify, and is at least partially responsible for modifying rules that govern courtroom procedures, lodging independent rulemaking power in the judicial branch will not alone guarantee that the
need for court reform will be perceived by the judiciary.
Indeed, the inherent quiescence of many rule-making bodies coupled
with a concentration of rule-making power in the judicial branch may
well increase the possibility that cost and delay problems will not be
acknowledged by the judicial officers of most states.
In these states, the impetus for change must come from outside the
judiciary. The executive and legislative branches, due to inadequate
technical staffing, partisan politics, and competing priorities, cannot
be relied upon to press for major trial court reforms. State bar associations on the other hand, are particularly suited to this task. In Lathrop
v. Donohue,1° the United States Supreme Court recognized that a state
bar association could be deemed to be an office of state government,
operating inter alia as a continuing commission on the state of judicial
administration. 11 State bar associations, therefore, could fulfill an
important governmental role by apprising judicial policy-makers of the
problems of trial court costs and delay, and lobbying the appropriate
rule-making body to consider enduring solutions.
2. Analysis- Analyzing possible solutions to the problems of litigation delays and costs is a necessary predicate to forming policy - the
alternative is uninformed decision making. In Kentucky, Chief Justice
Palmore carefully studied how other state judicial systems were attempting to reform their trial courts. He was persuaded that procedural rules
could be crafted to reduce the costs and delay attendant to Kentucky
litigation. He decided that the best way to counteract rules slowing
the pace of litigation and encrusting the process with needless procedure
would be to experiment with rules embodying the concepts _of total

9. A notable exception was the late Chief Justice C. William O'Neill of Ohio, who pushed
actively for criminal and civil docket reform through Ohio's Rules of Superintendence. By dint
of his energy and interest in docket reform, many Ohio trial courts reported some reduction
in delay, primarily for their criminal dockets. Ohio's failure to adopt rules governing caseflow,
as Kentucky did, however, has resulted in a retrogression since his death. See generally Grave
& Cheskin, Ruling Out Delay: The Impact of Ohio's Rules of Superintendence, 66 JUDICATURE
109 (1982).
Some chief justices have stimulated or actively supported reforms of the structure of state
court systems, such as centralizing administration and unifying trial courts. See Lowe, Unified
Courts in America: The Legacy of Roscoe Pound, 56 JUDICATURE 316-23 (1973). Arguably, unification is a precondition to effective docket reform.
IO. 367 U.S. 820 (1960).
II. Id. at 828-33, 848.
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case management 12 and active judicial control. 13 These concepts were
endorsed in 1974 by the American Bar Association (ABA), 14 and their
validity has since been confirmed by research conducted by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) 15 and the Federal Judicial Center
(FJC). 16 Rules were_ drafted that placed lawyers and judges on a time
schedule for every phase of litigation so that the typical case would
reach trial in six months.
Chief Justice Palmore delegated to his Administrative Office the tasks
of site selection, rule drafting, administrative planning, and evaluation, but made himself accessible when the stature of his office would
enhance the experiment's credibility. Most importantly, he personally
tracked the progress of the experiment throughout the eighteen month
trial period. The draft rules subjected courts to certain temporal constraints, and Chief Justice Palmore appreciated the need to monitor
the administration of the rules during the experimental phase of the
program. Consequently, members of his Administrative Office
periodically collected data reflecting rule compliance. These results were
reported to Chief Justice Palmore, and when he noted scheduling
breakdowns, he contacted the appropriate chief circuit judge regarding
the need to modify internal calendaring procedures.
At the end of the eighteen-month trial period, when most of the
cases subject to the experimental rules had been closed, Chief Justice
Palmore ordered an assessment of the impact of the rules on the practice of law and the administration of justice. An analysis of the findings, prepared by the American Bar Association, was forwarded to
the Chief Justice in June of 1982, and rule-making soon followed.
Trial court administration is a quickly changing field and experimentation or field testing in a court environment is a highly technical area
and may require greater expertise than most state bar associations have
available. At the analysis stage, though, the state bar served an important oversight function by commenting on site selection, and on the
12. The total case management concept entails case management over each case from filing
of the matter to disposition, settlement, dismissal, or trial. See generally Sipes, The Journey
Toward Delay Reduction in Trial Courts: A Traveler's Report, STATE CT. J., Spring 1982, at 4.
13. The active judicial control concept envisions the judge exercising his inherent and explicit
power to govern the procedural development of a case, in place of the adversaries exercising
perceived prerogatives to move the case along at their pace.
14. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON STANDARDS
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION RELATING TO TRIAL COURTS (1976).
15. See T. CHURCH, E. CARLSON, J. LEE & T. TAN, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGA·
TION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1978); L. SIPES, A. CARLSON, T. TAN, A. AIKMAN & R. PAGE,
MANAGING TO REDUCE DELAY (1980).
16. See generally P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE
CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978); P. CONNOLLY & P. LOMBARD, JUDICIAL CONTROLS
AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: MOTIONS (1980); 5. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT
MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1978).
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drafting of the experimental rules, and by soliciting support for the
experiment's objectives from the local bar. Moreover, judicial research
often has a low budget priority; state bars can help fund such research.
3. Rule Making- Persuaded by the favorable findings, Chief Justice
Palmore and Justice Stephens, a colleague on the Supreme Court and
ultimate successor as Chief Justice, persuaded fellow members of the
court that the experimental rules should be adopted as the official rules
of practice for Kentucky. Decision making was prompt and decisive;
by September 1982, the new rules were adopted and ordered to be
implemented in the civil dockets of Circuit Courts.
The relative speed with which the experimental rules replaced the
old court rules may partially be a consequence of the independent rulemaking authority of the Kentucky Supreme Court. A more bureaucratic
rule-making process - one like the federal process, which is layered
with committees and involves the legislature to a significant degree undoubtedly would have retarded promulgation of the rules. Moreover,
the independent nature of Kentucky's rule-making process may have
created an environment that abetted Chief Justice Palmore's efforts
towards a comprehensive court reform program. The efficiency of the
mle-making aspect of the reform effort in Kentucky, however, appears
to owe more to the leadership and skills of the Chief Justice and his
predisposition to effect change in the trial courts than to the nature
of Kentucky's rule-making process.
In many states the process of rule making involves the state bar in
a variety of roles, usually in an advisory capacity. To the extent that
the state bar has been following the reform process from the recognition stage, its advice to the judicial policy-making body at the rulemaking stage should flow as a matter of course even though the bar
does not have a formal role in the rule-making process. Thus, when
the state bar has been excluded from the reform process by the judiciary,
it should comment on the proposed reforms even if its views are not
officially considered by the rule makers.

B.

Implementation

The act of rule making does not by itself cure systemic court problems; promulgation of new rules does not automatically change practice, nor does it immediately produce expected results. On the contrary, implementing new rules entails a host of potential pitfalls, each
of which can defer change or frustrate reform. Successful procedural
reform involves two stages: active involvement of the bar in introducing the new program, and in monitoring its performance.
1. Introducing the program- The Kentucky -Supreme Court recognized that implementation of the new rules would fail unless it developed
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a sound implementation strategy. The new rules excepted circuit courts
from the rules' ambit, but delegated to the Supreme Court's Administrative Office the authority to void exceptions on a court-by-court basis.
The pace of implementation, therefore, was guided by the administrative
arm of the judiciary, which had sufficient responsibility and authority
to pave the way for the successful administration of the rules in the
circuit courts. The Kentucky Supreme Court selected three initial sites,
including the original experimental site, in which to pilot test the rules.
The Kentucky judiciary was aware of the need to familiarize both
the bench and the bar with the new rules. Consequently, for the bench,
the Administrative Office conducted a workshop for the judges and
staff personnel who would administer the new programs. At this
workshop, the Chief Judge of the Campbell County Circuit Court,
the experimental site, described potential implementation problems and
judges were able to obtain answers to practical questions about administration. The clerk and caseflow manager of the Campbell County
Circuit Court explained the monitoring and scheduling process and the
new court forms developed for the program. For the bar, the Kentucky Supreme Court scheduled a workshop for lawyers practicing in
each of the two new court sites. Members of Campbell County's bench
and bar gave presentations on the background and objective of the
programs, its rules, and the impact of these rules on practice in Campbell County. An open-ended question and answer period followed the
presentations. Chief Justice Palmore and Chief Justice-elect Stephens
participated in all three workshops. By attending, the two justices confirmed the judiciary's confidence in the program and its commitment
to the rules' successful implementation.
The process of introducing the rules also entailed an extensive analysis
of the host court's management system and resource needs. This analysis
is crucial. In Kentucky, for example, one of the host circuits covered
four counties, each of which maintained a holding court. In such circumstances, if the discovery and final pretrial conferences had been
conducted in the presiding judge's chambers with counsel present, the
cost in travel time might have offset savings from reduced procedural
formality under the rules. Conducting the conferences on the telephone
has been demonstrated to be an effective substitute for personal
appearance/ 7 and so the Administrative Office furnished the participating circuits with the equipment, budget, and training necessary
to conduct the conferences over the telephone. Without such preintroduction analysis, administration of the rules might have resulted
in no cost savings to litigants.
17.

See generally

CHAPPER

&

HANSON, PHASE

I

EVALUATION OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCING

TO CONDUCT MOTION HEARINGS IN CIVIL LITIGATION

(1982).
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Here again, the bar's role should primarily be one of oversight.
Because procedural rules cannot address significant shortcomings in
resources and court management, the state and local bar should take
steps to ensure that these implementation problems are squarely addressed by local judges, court administrators, and the legislature. 18
The state bar association might ask the administrative office of the
courts to draft an implementation plan for each court site. The local
bar could then review the plan with an eye towards insuring that
resources and docketing issues are addressed, as well as and.other court
management problems expected to constrain reform.
2. Monitoring Program Administration- Determining whether implementation has successfully minimized court costs and delay will continue to be a judicial function in Kentucky. The Supreme Court's
Administrative Office has developed a system to monitor the administration of the program by which certain milestone events in the progress
of program cases will be statistically analyzed. The resulting information has both operational and research potential. Sample data can be
periodically collected and studied by the Administrative Office staff.
If patterns of blockages in the movement of cases surface, the administrative office can alert the judge to the problems.
The local bar has a special interest in insuring that the local bench
continues to implement the master plan faithfully, and the state bar
can help facilitate this monitoring function.
Because the local bar would be unable to detect the level of adherence
and evaluate the effectiveness of the plan without access to the Administrative Office statistics, the state bar should lobby for local bar
access to the statewide judicial information system. Additionally, the
state bar should supply the local bar with the analytic expertise to open
and sustain an effective dialogue between the local bench and bar. Finally, where local problems are unsolvable because their causes are rooted
in state policy, the state bar should consider exerting lobbying pressure
on appropriate governmental bodies.

II.

BAR ORGANIZATION

Presently, most bar associations are incapable of serving as effective reform agents. They are typically limited both structurally and by
their varied perceptions of the bar's role in the reform process. For
example, the bar's role in judicial administration reform is often
IS. See generally Baar, The Scope and Limits of Court Reform, 5 JusT. SYS. J. 274 (1980).
Reform is essentially a political process. To effectuate change state bar associations must be
prepared to lobby state government entities, whether judicial or legislative, to obtain the resources
and management results that are needed to implement the rules.
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perceived by both the bench and the bar as reactive. This limits reform
efforts to bench initiatives. Lawyers tend to focus on specific rules
to cure perceived practice problems, but this myopia ignores systemic
causes of cost and delay, such as the failure of trial judges to take
control over their dockets and trial calendaring. Few lawyers have the
technical know-how needed to analyze docket delay and expense
problems, and state bar staffs usually cannot make up for this lack
of expertise. This places the bar at a disadvantage in maintaining an
intelligent dialogue with the bench. Bar politics may also be a factor
limiting the bar's role; the outcome of the race for the state bar
presidency rarely is based on a candidate's views on judicial administration reform. Absent a presidential priority favoring court reform, the
responsible committee, even if there is one, will not get the financial
assistance needed to take up the issue of court reform.
With some critical changes in philosophy and organization, though,
state and local bar associations could assume a role comparable to that
played by Chief Justice Palmore. A few state bar associations, such
as the Connecticut Bar Association, have begun taking more active
part in the reform process. 19 These bar groups share a number of
characteristics. For example, they tend to be headed by a bar leadership that financially and politically supports a comprehensive and
durable effort to reduce court costs and delay, and that is willing to
commit its time and resources to comprehensive court reform planning and efforts. Within the bar organization itself is a judicial or civil
committee that works with the judiciary to effect court cost and delay
reform and sponsors ongoing problem-raising sessions with the bar
membership. Often, these bar associations employ a court reform consultant and a professional lobbyist. The former assists the committee
in locating cost and delay problems and suggests solutions. The latter
is responsible for monitoring legislative activities affecting both bench
and bar, and for mobilizing legislative support for reform efforts. Most
have both an education program with a high priority placed on promoting an understanding of the special role of the bar in the justice
system, improving the quality of advocacy, and reducing litigation
abuses, and a disciplinary system that searches out patterns of abuse
in state or federal litigation, and punishes lawyers and law firms engaged
in such abuse.
These bar organizations serve as a model. By incorporating some
or all of these features, bar associations can enhance their role in the
crucial effort towards reducing court delays and costs through procedural reform.
19. See Quade, Let's Talk, 9 BAR LEADER 26 (1983). The author points to the bench-bar communication gap as an impediment to court reform, and cites examples where state bars have
successfully attempted to narrow that gap.
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CONCLUSION

To overcome judicial inertia towards reforming the courts, state and
local bar associations must recognize the need to make court reform
a priority and structure themselves to discharge this undertaking. Because
the judiciary is unlikely to encourage the creation of a reform-oriented
bar, the bar ultimately must assume the responsibility for sensitizing
lawyers to the need to engage in such activity, and for organizing the
association's oversight and policy-making functions. By actively engaging
in such reform-oriented measures, the bar can play a central role in
achieving the procedural reform necessary to reduce the delay and cost
of litigation.

